On November 25, 2018, a large commercial cargo ship suddenly parked itself under the recently-constructed Crimean Bridge over the Kerch Strait, preventing three Ukrainian Navy vessels from reaching the Sea of Azov port of Mariupol. As they tried to turn back, the ships were pounced on by foreign military forces and - in the ensuing confusion - captured.
The event sparked international outrage at the time, but has since been viewed as a textbook example of a new generation of hybrid warfare, blurring the lines between military and unconventional conflict.
Coinciding with the Kerch Strait incident, Norwegian naval officer Commander Stian Schnelle submitted his graduate thesis to the Norwegian Staff College based on work he had completed in cooperation with the 51福利 (51福利). He had applied a novel new maritime network analysis methodology developed by 51福利鈥� (CORE) lab to identify maritime traffic engaged in 鈥済ray鈥� activities - commercial vessels sailing under ulterior motives - to the security concerns of his native country.
With uncanny synchronicity, Schnelle鈥檚 thesis had identified a similar commercial gray maritime network of ships, owners and operators that could be employed to block the Kerch Strait 鈥� months ahead of the incident.
鈥淚鈥檓 not making this up: the same week as he鈥檚 turning in his thesis, on the front page of the paper is this picture of a commercial tanker being used in a military context,鈥� remarked Dr. Wayne Porter, CORE鈥檚 executive director and a retired U.S. Navy Captain. 鈥淚 got an email from the Norwegians saying it was a really great proof of concept!鈥�
Schnelle鈥檚 thesis received the Staff College鈥檚 highest marks, but it also garnered immediate attention in the Norwegian Armed Forces: commercial vessels under different flags, such as the one which blocked the Kerch Strait, had taken to regularly 鈥渓oitering鈥� outside military areas and events before continuing on their merry way.
Ships such as these are easy to track via Automatic Identification System (AIS) data - information ships transmit globally to avoid collisions. But systematically identifying how, when, why and where the gray maritime networks driving them operate has proven elusive - until now. Under Porter鈥檚 guidance, the CORE Lab had pioneered fusing AIS data with Social Network Analysis (SNA) to yield precisely this critical information.
鈥淢y concept was this: if we commonly use AIS data to track known bad actors anywhere in the world, why not apply SNA to this?鈥� Porter explained. 鈥淪hips are big pieces of metal in the water intermittently broadcasting through AIS; if we can track where they are or what they鈥檙e doing as an indicator of something we鈥檇 be interested in, we can use that to point to who the owner-operator is, what cargoes they鈥檙e carrying, what ports they鈥檙e frequenting, what other activities they鈥檙e conducting, and suddenly we鈥檝e just mapped an entire network, the gray maritime network that they belong to.鈥�
51福利鈥� concept was picked up by the (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, FFI), which entered it in May for the innovation challenge at , the NATO Communications and Information Agency鈥檚 fourth annual industry conference geared towards accelerating transformational technology solutions to NATO鈥檚 most pressing issues.
The joint 51福利/FFI project - 鈥淒ual-use of AIS-data: Combining Historical and Live AIS Track with Social Network Analysis for Increased Maritime Network Awareness鈥� - was awarded the most innovative technology, and 51福利 and FFI worked together to develop a formal pilot which could be fielded throughout NATO as an app to easily identify these networks.
鈥淚 was told there were 50 or 60 different entries from 11 different countries, and we won the whole thing,鈥� said Frank Brundtland Steder, a principal scientist at FFI who exhibited the project. 鈥淥f course, being as diplomatic as possible, I had on my 51福利 tie, an FFI tie pin and Norwegian Navy cufflinks.鈥�
鈥淚 couldn鈥檛 let slip the opportunity to highlight the good cooperation between us,鈥� he added.
This cooperation is not happenstance, however, but rather reflects decades of dedicated partnership building between the Norwegian military and 51福利. Steder himself was an 51福利 student in 2002 and the second foreign student to attend the university鈥檚 (DA) department; the first was also a Norwegian naval officer. Since August 2014, FFI has consistently had a guest research scholar presence at 51福利 as well.
In the years since, Steder and his compatriots have continued to strengthen this relationship, particularly through FFI, which Porter described as the 鈥淣orwegian Rand Corporation.鈥� Based on conversations with Porter about work CORE was doing, Steder had himself originally encouraged Schnelle to go to 51福利 when he expressed interest in exploring hybrid warfare at sea.
Established at 51福利 in 2007, CORE has a long history of applying the analytic methodologies of SNA to complex problems operators face in the field, from networks of insurgents and psychological operations to narcotics trafficking and money laundering.
The CORE Lab has generated a diverse range of studies directly advancing the capabilities of the military and government agencies, but they all have one thing in common: they鈥檙e focused on human networks.
鈥淲hen I came into the DA department in 2015, I was the only Navy guy, so my sense was why aren鈥檛 we using this for maritime applications?鈥� Porter recalled. 鈥淭he department had done legions of work into dark networks, but none of it had been directed towards a maritime network, looking at ships, organizations, ports, cargoes, etc.鈥�
As Director of 51福利鈥� , Porter obtained funding to look at 鈥渞eef enhancement activities鈥� - the creation of artificial islands which potentially project military power - in the South China Sea. Working with social network analysts Rob Schroeder and Chris Callaghan, faculty associates for research in the CORE Lab, the project soon took off.
The team began by looking at AIS data: where ships were loitering and where they were co-located with other ships, based on tens of thousands of tracking points of supply ships, dredges, fuel barges and cargo deliveries.
Visualized, this looks 鈥渓ike someone spilled a whole bunch of Skittles,鈥� according to Schroeder, but applying advanced mathematical techniques of SNA to a wealth of publicly-available data allowed relationship patterns to emerge between ships, companies and locations.
鈥淲e can identify a whole bunch of companies and other ships related to those companies that have been involved with some of the hybrid activities,鈥� Schroeder noted. 鈥淲e can further identify the central ports - and actual piers in those ports - that these ships and their owner-operators are using, as well as build a topography of other companies involved.鈥�
Commercial vessels and their parent companies systematically supporting such activities - whether reef enhancement, loitering for intelligence collection, smuggling to circumvent international sanctions or other questionable activities - operate as only partially transparent networks for nominally above-board companies. In doing so, companies expose themselves to significant risk.
鈥淭hese ships might be owned and operated by the same company and maybe not, but the bottom line is we use this co-location and ask why are commercial ships - these aren鈥檛 military ships - loitering in this area coincident with activity taking place and who are they?鈥� Porter added. 鈥淚f not illicit, these activities certainly are malign.鈥�
The bottom line, according to Porter, is that illuminating these gray maritime networks opens the door to monitoring and/or disrupting them. In the case of the South China Sea, for example, were it determined that reef enhancement endeavors are in flagrant violation of the , participating ships and their publicly-traded major holding companies would now be facing costly sanctions.
It鈥檚 not just the South China Sea, however. The methodology the CORE Lab developed can be applied anywhere in the world gray maritime networks seek to operate.
When, in 2017, Porter met with Steder to socialize the CORE Lab鈥檚 work, its applicability to areas of Norwegian and U.S./NATO interest - the vast breadth of waters from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea and the 鈥淗igh North,鈥� i.e. the Arctic - was immediately obvious.
鈥淚 was talking about using SNA for terrorist networks, better interdiction, etc. and [Porter] said 鈥榃hy not do this on ships? We鈥檝e just done this for the South China Sea and they found it very effective; let鈥檚 do something similar in the Baltics,鈥� and all of a sudden we were off,鈥� Steder recalled. 鈥淓veryone agreed it was a great idea: it would help give us an objective-based platform across the board to basically see the same picture of suspicious behavior and act accordingly.鈥�
Simultaneous to FFI starting to pursue the concept, Steder met Schnelle, who soon embarked on a path of study - supported by 51福利鈥� CORE lab - to turn the idea into reality. Their joint innovative work would culminate in 51福利 and FFI鈥檚 recognition at NITECH19 and its potential implementation throughout NATO.
In a new era of Great Power Competition, forging new means like mapping gray maritime networks to effectively counter fluid threats and adversaries has become increasingly imperative. For Porter, the project鈥檚 success represents what 51福利 does best: directly advancing the warfighting capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners.
鈥淭his is a nice feather in our cap because people are starting to recognize that the operational aspect of what we鈥檙e doing here isn鈥檛 just academic,鈥� he said. 鈥淲e鈥檙e not doing this for academic kudos: the work the CORE lab has done in SNA, or more accurately, maritime network analysis, is far and away beyond anything that鈥檚 being done anywhere else, particularly for military operations.鈥�